Annual Lecture 2017

9 November 2017

Pyrrhonian scepticism has roots in metaphysical discussions relevant to relativism. This lecture reconstructs these discussions in Plato's Theaetetus and explores how different versions of Pyrrhonian scepticism – the scepticism of Pyrrho, Aenesidemus, and Sextus Empiricus – compare to Protagorean relativism. It begins with a sketch of why Plato interprets Protagoras' Measure Doctrine as global relativism rather than relativism about a particular domain. Pyrrhonian scepticism, it is argued, inherits this global scope. But Pyrrhonian responses to disagreement have important differences from the responses envisaged by Protagorean relativism. Scepticism suggests that, when encountering disagreement, it is rational to step back from one's view and investigate, rather than simply to hold on to one's view, as the relativist presumably does. The lecture defends scepticism's response to disagreement as construed by Sextus Empiricus as being superior to earlier proposals.

Venue
Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies
Schlüterstraße 51 (5th floor)
Room 5060
20146 Hamburg

The event is open to the public, with advance registration via e-mail:
maimonides-centre"AT"uni-hamburg.de