Lang, Lukas
Junior Fellow: October 2017–September 2018
Research Project: The Anti-Sceptical Potential of Thomas Reid's Common Sense Philosophy
One promising strategy for dealing with scepticism is to appeal to common sense. Thomas Reid (1710–1796) developed a theory of common sense that validates this appeal, if successful. By rejecting the theory of ideas and by putting his own theory of perception in its place, Reid's theory of common sense is far superior to those of Moore, Wittgenstein, and contemporary philosophers. However, the fruitfulness of Reid's philosophy depends in part on just what role common sense plays. It is arguable that it is common sense that shields his theory of perception, but this theory of perception makes the role played by common sense in his broader theory much more plausible. So, there is a question of whether common sense sits at the very fundament of his theory, or whether it is dependent on his other views. Thus, this project aims (i) to explore the relationship between Reid's common sense philosophy and his other views, especially his theory of perception, and (ii) to argue that Reid, who is mostly seen as fighting Humean scepticism, has in fact enough material to argue against other forms of scepticism as well.
Lukas Lang is currently working on his PhD under the supervision of Professor Stephan Schmid. His project explores the anti-sceptical potential of Thomas Reid's common sense philosophy and contrasts it with the theories of Moore and contemporary philosophers.